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Essays on Structured Finance and Housing Markets 
 
Yaw Asamoah Owusu-Ansah 
 
 The fall in housing market prices has played a major role in triggering the Great 
Recession. This led to the collapse of markets for mortgage-backed securities, and to a 
precipitous fall in their ratings. This thesis studies the downgrading of mortgaged-backed 
Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO), and the factors that drive mortgage default loans.    
In Chapter 1, I look at the CDO market. The downgrading of the tranches of 
Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) products backed by real estate related assets has caused 
severe disruptions in the housing and financial markets. The rating agencies have been criticized 
for the opacity in the rating process of the CDO products and also for giving the CDO tranches 
higher ratings than they deserved. However, not enough attention has been paid to the decision 
making process of the agencies to downgrade the CDO tranches. We use data from Moody’s 
CDO database to reconstruct the process through which Moody’s eventually downgraded the 
tranches. We use a discrete hazard rate model to study the variables that were relevant in the 
downgrading of the tranches of the CDOs. The empirical results show that out of the many CDO 
 
 
specific variables relevant to their ratings made available by Moody’s few have any explanatory 
power beyond the Moody’s Deal Scores (MDS). We show that the MDS could be explained by 
the changes in the Case-Shiller Composite-20 Index and Markit ABX.HE indices. Further 
analysis shows that Moody’s mostly relied on the changes in the Case-Shiller indexes in revising 
the MDS. 
 In Chapter 2 I look at the factors that influence default rates. The chapter uses a 
Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model to study the dynamics of the impact of 
unemployment and home price index shocks on mortgage default rates from 1979 to 2000 and 
from 2001 to 2010. We first fit the model to the 1979 to 2000 sample and forecast the changes in 
the national and regional mortgage default rates from 2001 to 2010. The model did a good job in 
forecasting the actual changes in the mortgage default rates from 2001 to 2007; however, it failed 
after 2008. The results for the 1979 to 2000 and 2001 to 2010 periods indicate that the dynamic 
response of the mortgage default rate to unemployment and home price index shocks changed at 
the national, regional and state levels after 2000. Unemployment and home price shocks seem to 
have become more important during the 2001 to 2010 period. The two shocks are responsible on 
average for about 60% of the movement in the regional mortgage default rates during this period. 
Except for the Pacific region, California and Florida, most of the variations in the mortgage 
default rates at the national, regional and state levels are explained by the unemployment shocks. 
The post 2000 results could be attributed to the increase in the number of mortgage loan 
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What Went Wrong? Examining Moody’s Rated CDO Data 
 
1.1  Introduction 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) pool economic assets (e.g. loans, bonds, 
mortgage account receivables, etc.) and issue multiple classes of financial claims with different 
levels of seniority (or tranches) against the collateral pool. Individual asset risk should be 
diversified so long as the pooled assets are not perfectly correlated. CDOs bundle the cash flows 
from the underlying assets, which are often illiquid receivables, into tradable tranches. This 
theoretically facilitates the redistribution of risks within the financial sector, which could have a 
positive impact on financial stability. More importantly, the structured nature of the claims with 
different levels of seniority makes it possible for investors with different risk profiles to 
participate in this market. The increase in the packaging of mortgage loan related assets into 
CDOs during the 2003 to 2007 period contributed to improved liquidity for mortgage loans and 
lower borrowing costs for borrowers. However, during the 2008 to 2012 period, the collapses of 
these CDOs have contributed to the problems in the housing markets and also in the 
development of the ongoing financial crises.  From the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA), total
1
 CDO issuance increased from $86B in 2003 to a peak of $481B in 
2007. The total issuance then fell to $4.3B in 2009 before rising modestly to $10.8 in the first 2 
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quarters of 2012. The fall in the CDO origination has important implications for liquidity and 
borrowing costs for the mortgage market going forward.  
The collapse in the CDO market was triggered by the wholesale downgrading of the 
tranches of the CDOs by the rating agencies. After the downgrades, financial institutions that 
have invested
2
 in the CDO products incurred significant losses on their CDO holdings; which 
have led to big write-downs. The downgrades also forced some institutional investors (who were 
also major investors in the CDOs) to hold fire sales of their CDO holdings, thereby pushing the 
values of the CDO products even further down. The big three rating agencies (Moody’s, S&P 
and Fitch) have been under criticism for their role in the collapse of the CDO market. They have 
been faulted for the opacity in the rating process of the CDOs, for using incorrect rating 
methodologies and assumptions, and also for not demanding more information from mortgage 
borrowers initially. There have also been conflict of interest questions raised about the 
relationship between CDO issuers and the rating agencies: in some cases the agencies helped the 
CDO issuers package the underlying assets to garner a specific rating by setting up ancillary 
consulting services. As a result of the large fees
3
 the rating agencies were making from rating 
these CDOs and also from helping to package them, they may not have been as alert as they 
should have been. The CDO issuers could also shop
4
 for better ratings, which put a lot of 
pressure on the rating agencies to give favorable ratings to the CDOs. Given the size and 
complexity of the collaterals (in some cases these assets are themselves tranches of other CDOs) 
in the CDO deals, it was costly for investors to independently price and evaluate all the assets in 
the collateral pool. As such, they relied on the ratings giving by the rating agencies to access 
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 Some were also major underwriters of the CDO deals.  
3
 This represented a significant portion of their revenues.  
4





their credit risks and also make their investment decisions. The agencies created a perception
5
  
that the rated CDOs had the same risk as similarly rated corporate bonds.  This attracted a lot of 
investors to these highly rated CDOs, fuelling the growth of the CDO market during the 2003 to 
2007 years.  
There have been different theories as to why the CDOs backed by real estate assets were 
downgraded massively during the recent financial crisis: (1) the underlying assets were of low 
quality to begin with and they deteriorated in value during the financial crisis causing the CDOs 
to fail the quality tests required to support their initial ratings. (2) The variables, default 
correlation
6
 in particular, pertinent for the ratings of the CDOs were underestimated (the so-
called “underestimation theory”) leading the agencies to give generous ratings to the CDOs. As 
these variables were revised during the crisis the tranches of the CDOs were downgraded 
accordingly.  (3) The ratings methodology employed by the agencies to rate the CDOs was faulty.  
Obtaining reliable data on CDOs is difficult, since CDOs are not actively traded on 
exchanges. I have been fortunate to be given access to one of the most extensive data on CDOs 
compiled by Moody’s Corporation. With this data this paper throws some much-needed light on 
how CDOs backed by real estate assets were downgraded in 2008 and 2009.   
The share of real estate related assets in CDO products increased significantly after 2003 
when other assets—franchise loan Asset Backed Securities (ABS), aircraft lease ABS, High 
Yield Collateralize Bond Obligations etc.—fared badly after the 2001-2002 economic recession. 
The total percentage of subprime, alternative and prime mortgage loan related assets which made 
up only about 15% of the total assets in CDO products in 2000 increased to over 80% by 2006. 
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 Given their role as the assessors of credit risk (Nationally Recognized Rating Organization (NRSRO) designation) 
their ratings of the CDO were taken at face value. The ratings were relied on for investment and capital requirements 
decisions.  
6
 This measures the default correlation of the underlying assets. A low default correlation value assigned to a CDO 





Real estate related assets became the main collateral in the CDO deals during the securitization 
boom. 
 For the CDO deals backed by real estate related assets included in the study, about 70% 
of the tranches were rated A or better. At the end of the sample period (May 2009), only 52% of 
the tranches rated AAA were still rated AAA, only 58% of the AA tranches were still rated AA 
and only 14% of A tranches were still rated A.  
We use a discrete hazard rate model to study the variables that were relevant in the 
downgrading of the tranches of the CDOs backed by real estate related assets. Two categories of 
downgrading
7
 are studied: (A) A CDO is considered downgraded if any of its tranches is 
downgraded, or (B) A CDO is considered downgraded if its AAA tranche is downgraded. 
Besides CDO specific variables that are important in the ratings of the CDOs made available by 
Moody’s the paper also considers some CDO specific variables that might contribute to their 
downgrading. In addition, we also make use of Moody’s Deal Scores (MDS) assigned to the 
CDO deals. The MDS are internally generated scores which range from -10 (best) to +10 (worst). 
Moody’s does not release information on what they take into account when calculating the scores 
for the CDO deals.  
For both categories of downgrading considered, (A) and (B), changes in the Moody’s 
Deal Scores (MDS) assigned to the CDOs by Moody’s are the only variable that explains tranche 
downgrades.  However, the changes in the Moody’s Deal Scores could not easily be explained 
by the changes in the CDO specific variables, implying that a significant variation of the MDS is 
based on outside information. We show that the evolution of the MDS could be explained by the 
changes in the Case-Shiller Composite-20 index (which measures the changes in the total value 
of all existing single-family housing stock) and the Markit ABX.HE indices (which track the 
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prices of credit default swaps (CDS) of mortgage backed security) two months before Moody’s 
adjusted the scores they gave to the deals. This suggests that Moody’s based its rating changes 
on external housing market information than CDO-specific information. The fluctuations in the 
Case-Shiller Composit-20 and the Markit ABX.HE indexes provide Moody’s with extra 
information in addition to the CDO specific variables to better assess the riskiness of the CDO 
deals. A further analysis measuring the relative importance of the Case-Shiller Composite-20 
index and the ABX.HE indices in the evolution of the MDS showed that Moody’s relied more on 
the changes in the Case-Shiller Composite-20 index in revising the MDS. 
The paper does not find empirical support for the default correlation “underestimation 
theory”. The overwhelming factor in the wholesale downgrading of the tranches of the CDOs 
backed by real estate related assets during the crisis was the collapse in the housing market.  
 The paper contributes to the growing empirical literature that has been examining CDO 
deals at the micro level. Coval et al (2009) documented some of the challenges faced by the 
rating agencies, in particular, the parameter and modeling assumptions that are required to arrive 
at accurate ratings of structured finance products. Coval et al concluded that, unlike traditional 
corporate bonds, whose fortunes are primarily driven by firm-specific considerations, the 
performance of securities created by tranching large asset pools is strongly affected by the 
performance of the economy as a whole.  Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) presented evidence on 
the relation between CDO credit ratings and the quality of the underlying collateral backing these 
securities. A large fraction of the CDO tranches in their sample had AAA
8
 ratings (70%). They 
provided evidence which showed a mismatch between the rating of CDO tranches and the credit 
quality of the underlying assets supporting these tranches; while the credit rating of the majority 
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of the tranches is AAA, the average credit rating of the collateral is B+
9
.  Mason and Rosner 
(2007) showed that many of the difficulties in the CDO market backed by real estate related 
assets could be attributed to the incorrect ratings given to them. The incorrect ratings were a 
result of rating agencies rating CDO products by misapplying the methodologies used for rating 
corporate bonds. This methodological issue was further compounded by the inaccurate estimates 
of the underlying variables (e.g. default correlation of the underlying assets, etc.).   
Our conclusion is similar to the conclusions reached by these papers: (1) we also 
observed in our analyses, limited to CDO ratings of mortgaged related assets, that CDO ratings 
are more affected by the performance of the economy as whole rather than CDO-specific 
variables. (2) The diversification benefit which was expected from pooling all the different assets, 
thereby influencing the ratings of CDOs backed by mortgage related assets, was not as potent as 
initially thought.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 Introduces CDO. Section 3 discusses the 
general characteristics of the CDO deals included in the study. Section 4 compares the CDOs 
backed by real estate related assets to CDOs backed by other assets. Section 5 discusses how the 
downgrading of the CDOs backed by real estate related assets occurred. Section 6 presents the 
Hazard Model. Section 7 presents the causality model. Section 8 concludes.  
 
1.2 Background: CDO 
Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) is an example of Structured Finance (SF) product 
backed by a diversified pool of one or more classes of debt e.g., corporate and emerging market 
bonds, asset backed securities (ABS), mortgage backed securities (CMBS and RMBS), real 
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estate investments trust (REIT), bank debt, synthetic credit instruments, such as, credit default 
swaps (CDS), notes issued by special purpose entity (SPE), future receivables, loans, etc. CDOs 
can also be backed by the tranches of other CDOs (CDO-squared) and other SF products
10
. 
The CDO structure consists of an asset manager in charge of managing the portfolio. The 
funds needed to purchase the underlying assets are obtained from the issuance of debt obligations. 
The debt obligations are also referred to as tranches, and they are: 
 Senior tranches 
 Mezzanine tranches 
 Equity tranche  
A rating is sought for all but the equity tranche. The tranches are prioritized depending on 
how they absorb losses from the underlying assets in case of default. Senior tranches only absorb 
losses after the mezzanine and equity tranches have been exhausted. This allows the senior 
tranche to get a credit rating higher than the average rating of the underlying assets as a whole.  
The senior tranche usually attracts at least an A rating. Since the equity tranche receives the 
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 According to Moody’s , the percentage of CDOs that had other structured assets as their collateral increased from 
2.6% in 1998 to 55% in 2006 as a fraction of the total notional of all securitization. In 2006 alone, issuance of 





Figure 1 Basic CDO Structure 
 
Table 1.1 is an example that shows the percentage of losses that has to be absorbed by the 
lower tranches before the senior tranche is affected: 5% of the notional value of the underlying 
assets has to default before the coupon and principal payments to the mezzanine tranches get 
affected. For all defaults below 5%, the only investor who gets affected is the equity tranche 
investor. The senior tranche does not get affected until 15% of the underlying asset defaults.  
 
Table 1.1 
This table shows the percentage of losses that has to be absorbed by the lower tranches in the 








Equity 0 5% 
Mezzanine 5% 15% 





























 illustrates a payment structure of a cash-flow CDO.  The cash outlay to 
the tranche investors is the coupon payment times the principal outstanding. The equity tranche 
receives a higher coupon rate than the other two tranches because it is the first tranche to be 
affected in case of asset defaults, so it is relatively riskier than the other tranches.   
 
Table 1.2 
This table illustrates a basic cash-flow $200 million CDO structure with coupon rate offered at 








 are run to make sure that the CDO is performing within prespecified 
guidelines before any payments are made to the mezzanine and equity tranches. The prespecified 
guidelines are included in the prospectus given to investors before the tranches of the CDOs are 
sold. If the CDO faults the coverage tests, then excess interest on the portfolio are diverted to pay 
the interest and principal on the senior tranche from the mezzanine and equity tranches. Quality 
Tests that deal with maturity restrictions, the degree of diversification, and credit ratings of assets 
in the collateral portfolio must also be satisfied for the tranches of the CDO to maintain the credit 
rating assigned at the time of issuance.  
                                                          
11
 This example is a modified version of the examples in Goodman and Fabozzi (2002). 
12
 The information about the tests is provided in the prospectus before the sale. Coverage tests are designed to 
protect note holders against deterioration of the existing portfolio. There are two categories of tests—
overcollateralization tests (OC) and interest coverage (IC) tests. The OC for a tranche is found by computing the 
ratio of the principal balance of the collateral portfolio over the principal balance of the tranche and all tranches 
senior to it. The higher the ratio, the greater protection for the note holders; the value is usually compared to the 
required minimum ratio specified in the guidelines. The IC test is the ratio of scheduled interest due on the 
underlying collateral portfolio to scheduled interest to be paid to that tranche and all the tranches senior to it. Again 
the higher the IC ratio, the greater the protection; the value is usually compared to the required minimum ratio 
specified in the guidelines.  
Tranche Par Value Coupon Rate 
Senior $120,000,000 Libor +   70 b.p 
Mezzanine     70,000,000  Libor + 200 b.p 





 The share of real estate related assets in CDO products increased significantly after 2003 
partly due to the increase in home price appreciation after the 2001-2002 recessions. The cash 
and hybrid SF CDO (these two make up over 90% of the total CDO issued) deals rated by 
Moody’s had more than 80% of its collateral comprise of real estate related assets, especially, 
subprime residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) by 2006. Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of CDO underlying asset types over the years. Since 2001, the share of the Subprime, 















  The data was obtained from Moody’s and it contains information (collateral, deal and 
tranche levels) on Moody’s rated CDO deals. The data on the underlying assets of the CDO deals 
are: the type of the assets (loans, equity, or bond), the price that was paid for the underlying 
assets, who rated the included assets (Moody’s, Fitch or S&P), the recovery rate of the 
underlying assets, industry classification of the assets, the expected average life of the assets, 
yield to maturity of the assets, seasoning (how long the assets have been in existence) etc.  The 
deal level data include: the notional values of the CDOs, the par value of the defaulted securities, 
the par value of the defaulted securities loss, principal and interest cash collected from the 
underlying assets, The tranche level data include the initial and current ratings of the tranches, 
the amount of each tranches issued in relation to the total value of the CDO deal, coupon rate of 
the tranches, the estimated net asset value of the tranches, and the attachment and detachment 
points of the tranches.  
 
 
1.3.1 Deals Included 
 The sample is divided into three categories: (a) All CDOs backed by collateral consisting 
of only real estate related assets
13
 (Real Estate), (b) All CDOs backed by collateral consisting of 
only non-real estate related assets (Non Real Estate), and  (c) All CDO backed by both real estate 
related assets and non-real estate related assets (Mixed).  
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 There are 1936 Moody’s rated CDOs included in this study14; of which 1119 are only 
Real Estate Deals, 121 are Non Real Estate Deals, and 696 are Mixed Deals by my classification.  
 
1.3.2 Total Tranche Amount of the Deals  
 Table 1.3 reports the average par value of the collateral of the deals included in the study. 
The Real Estate only deals have an average of $902M, the Non Real Estate deals have an 
average of $243M and the Mixed deals have an average of $550M.  
 
Table 1.3 
Original Par Value of Collateral 
This table reports the total amount of issued tranches in the CDO deals ($Million) 
Type of CDO Max Min  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Real Estate  163666   5 902 4328 
Non Real Estate 1716   0.65 243 228 
Mixed 50000   6 550 632 
 
1.3.3 Types of Tranches  
About 85% of the tranches of the Real Estate deals were either senior or mezzanine (both 
these tranches are rated). Since losses are allocated from the bottom up, it takes significant losses 
from the underlying assets for the senior tranches to be affected when there are large numbers of 
mezzanine tranches. The Real Estate CDO deals have more mezzanine tranches, making the 
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 About 674 of the deals from the Moody’s database were not included because we could not classify the 






Types of Tranches 
This table reports the types of tranches issued 
Type of CDO Senior Mezzanine Subordinate( Equity) 
Real Estate  2582(30%) 4872(56%) 1207(14%) 
Non Real estate   395(58%)   184(27%)     98(14%) 
Mixed 2026(45%) 1675(37%)   794(18%) 
 
1.3.4 Tranche Ratings  
Due to the costs involved for investors to independently monitor all the assets in a CDO 
portfolio, investors rely on the credit ratings of the CDOs to judge how risky they are and also to 
make investment decisions. In the absence of hard data on some of the assets underlying the 
CDO products, the rating agencies make assumptions about the values of these variables and rely 
mainly on simulations to determine the ratings they give to the CDOs. For example, until 2007, 
Moody’s did not require issuers seeking ratings on products backed by mortgages to provide 
information on borrowers’ debt-to-income ratio, appraisal type and which lender originated the 
loan.
15
  There is also very limited empirical work on CDO tranche losses in the event of defaults 
due to their very short history  
 
 1.3.4.1 How CDOs are Rated 
According to Moody’s Approach to Rating Multisector CDOs (2000), Moody’s consider 
these variables in determining CDO Ratings:  
 Collateral diversification 
 Likelihood of default of underlying assets 
 Recovery rates 
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Collateral Diversification: a diversity score is calculated by dividing the assets in the 
CDO portfolio into different classifications. This also measures the default correlation of the 
underlying assets. A higher diversity score implies that it is less likely that all the assets would 
default at the same time. It plays a very important role in the ratings of the tranches; depending 
on how high the diversity score is, a large fraction of the issued tranches can end up with a 
higher rating than the average rating of the underlying pool of assets. This means that there will 
be a bigger percentage of higher-rated tranches (senior and mezzanine) in the CDO. To get a 
high diversification score, a CDO will normally include a lot of different securities.   
Likelihood of Default is provided by the weighted average rating factor (WARF). The 
WARF is a guide to asset quality of the portfolio and is meant to incorporate the probability of 
default for each of the bonds in the CDO.  For example, a WARF score of 610 means that there 
is a 6.1% probability of default for each independent and uncorrelated asset in 10 year period.  
Recovery Rates are dependent on the desired rating of the CDO tranche. Ratings agencies 
have data on the historical recovery rate
16
 of bonds they have rated, and based on this data they 
calculate a weighted recovery rate for the portfolio.  
The agencies have an expected loss permissible for each CDO tranche to garner a specific 
rating. For each tranche of the deals, a simulated expected loss is compared to the maximum 
permitted for any given rating. 
Table 1.5 reports the distribution of the initial ratings for the Real Estate (8661 total 
tranches), Non Real Estate (677 total tranches), and Mixed (4495 total tranches). The equity 
tranches are not rated.  About 90% of the Moody’s rated tranches of the Real Estate Deals were 
rated BBB or better (investment grade), about 86% for the Non Real Estate deals, 87% of the 
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Mixed Deals. Only 2 tranches out of a total of 10487 tranches were rated CCC or lower (“Junk 
grade”).  
Table 1.6 reports the distribution of the tranches as of May 13
th
 2009. About 59% of the 
tranches of the Real Estate CDOs were downgraded
17
 to B or lower (“Junk”), about 30% of the 
Non Real Estate deals were downgraded to B or lower, and about 42%  of the Mixed CDOs were 
downgraded to B or lower.  
 
Table 1.5 
Initial Moody’s Rating18 
This table reports the initial Moody’s rating for the tranches 
Type of 
CDO 
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC C 
Real 
Estate  
2295 1211 1191 1319 669 27 0 0 0 




  157     70     58   125   52 17 0 1 0 
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 A transition matrix for the Real Estate CDOs is provided in Table 1.12.  
18






Current Moody’s Rating 
This table reports the current Moody’s rating for the tranches as of 05/13/2009 
Type of 
CDO 
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC C 
Real 
Estate  
1317 816 217 615 646 651 506 434 1730 




6 17 8 13 17 17 27 46 56 
          
Mixed 344 272 142 256 288 253 223 190 442 
 
1.4. Comparisons 
 This section reports some of the characteristics of the underlying assets for the three 
categories of the CDO deals: Real Estate, Non Real Estate and Mixed.   
 
1.4.1 Average Weighted Seasoning of Collateral  
 On average the securities in the Non Real Estate deals are more seasoned than the Real 
Estate Deals.  
Table 1.7 
This table reports the average number of years since the securities in the collaterals were issued. 
Type of CDO Max Min  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Real Estate  23.667 0.08 3.190 1.384 
Non Real estate 22.417 0.08 6.380 3.134 
Mixed 39.167 0.08 5.27 2.759 
 
Figure 3 shows a graph of the cumulative defaults rates of subprime, Alt-A and Prime 
mortgage loans compiled by Standard and Poor’s. The cumulative default metric includes both 
“active defaults” (seriously delinquent loans that have not been liquidated yet and “closed 
defaults” loans that have already being liquidated. As it appears from Table 1.8, a large 







, as figure 3 shows even after three years (36 months) the cumulative default 
rate for the subprime loan is yet to plateau, this is especially true of the subprime 2005, 2006 and 
2007 loans which make up the bulk of the underlying loans in the real estate related assets 





1.4.3 Types of Assets in Collateral of the Deals 
A large fraction of the Real Estate CDO deals issued over the course of the last several 
years have subprime loans, and subprime RMBS as the underlying asset. The increase in the 
mortgage loan default rates from 2007 to 2009 affected subprime mortgage loans the most. Some 
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of the CDOs are themselves also made of tranches
20
 of other CDOs and asset backed securities. 
It is also difficult for Moody’s to incorporate ratings of CDO products into their model, 
especially, if they are rated by other agencies. Moody’s noted in their CDO Asset Exposure 
Report 2006 that it takes between three to seven weeks to normally incorporate ratings change 
from other agencies into their own CDO ratings for CDO-squared deals. The percentage of the 
Real Estate deals with mortgage loans as their underlying asset is about 60%.   
Table 1.8 
Type of Collateral 
This table describes the number and percentage of the deals with these types of collateral 
Type of 
CDO 
Loan Equity CDO Bond ABS RMBS/MBS/CMBS 
Real 
Estate  
671(60%) 46(4%) 306(27%) 467(42%) 168(15%) 240(21%) 
       
Non Real 
Estate 
45(37%) 57(47%) 17(14%) 81(67%) 9(7%) 0 
       
Mixed 314(45%) 136(20%) 126(18%) 456(66%) 32(5%) 107(15%) 
 
 
1.4.4 Weighted Average Maturity   
 On average, the securities in the collateral of the Real Estate deals have more years left 
for them to mature. As a result, the Real Estate deals might be subject to more market risk. 
 
Table 1.9 
Weighted Average Maturity 
This table reports the par weighted average life of the securities in collateral (in other words, the 
average years left for the securities in the collateral to mature) 
Type of CDO Max Min  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Real Estate  24.51 0 13.859 11.171 
Non Real estate 29.621 0 5.30 4.284 
Mixed 49.970 0.08 10.37 8.459 
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1.5 How the Downgrades Occurred 
This section provides more information about the tranche downgrade process. There are 
1119 Real Estate CDO deals in the data. The deals have a total of 8661 tranches of which 6712 
are rated.
21
 4344 (65%) of the tranches have been downgraded from their initially assigned 
ratings. 94 (out of a total of 1119) of the CDO deals have never had any of their tranches 
downgraded. 1025 of the CDO deals have at least one of their tranches downgraded.  Of the 




Initial Moody’s Rating 
This table reports the initial Moody’s rating for the Real Estate backed CDO tranches 
Type of 
CDO 
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC C 
Real 
Estate  
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May, 13 2009 (Final Date) 
This table reports the final transition ratings matrix of the tranches as of May, 13 2009 in 
percentages. The rows represent the initial ratings of the tranches, and the columns represent the 
ratings as of May, 13, 2009 
 AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC C WR
22
 
           
AAA 52% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 4% 12% 21% 6% 
           
AA 0 58% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 4% 29% 3% 
           
A 0 0 14% 22% 24% 2% 2% 3% 29% 4% 
           
BBB 0 0 0 19% 16% 26% 3% 3% 30% 4% 
           
BB 0 0 0 0 9% 25% 38% 3% 21% 3% 
           
B 0 0 0 0 0 11% 44% 26% 15% 4% 
           
 
 Only 52% of the tranches rated AAA were still rated AAA on May, 13 2009; 37% were 
downgraded to CCC or lower. Also, only 58% of the AA tranches were still rated AA, most were 
downgraded to CCC or lower. There seem to be shorter jumps in the downgrading of the lower 
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1.6 Explaining Downgrades  
The downgrading of the CDO tranches caused investors to write down significant 
amounts of money on their highly-rated CDO holdings, especially during the 2008-2009 
financial crisis. This section proposes a model to explain the downgrade probability of CDOs 
backed by real estate related assets. The observation window is from 1
st





 Two definitions of downgrading are studied: (a) A CDO is considered 
downgraded if any of its tranches is downgraded, (b) A CDO is considered downgraded if its 
AAA tranche is downgraded. In addition to the default correlation and a measure of the quality 
of the underlying asset, the paper also considers some CDO specific characteristics that might 
contribute to their downgrading. In addition, we also make use of Moody’s Deal Scores (MDS). 
 
1.6.1 Estimation Procedure—Discrete Hazard Rate Model 
The framework chosen for the analysis is a discrete time proportional hazard rate model. 
Let    be a discrete duration random variable for a CDO  , where   {     }  
The conditional hazard rate,         ) ), is the probability of a downgrade of CDO   in 
any Quarter   given covariates     ): 
 
  )             (      ))      
             ))            
 The survival probability at Quarter   is defined as the probability of a CDO   not 
experiencing a downgrade, which is defined as: 
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             )) 
                                     ∏ (    (      )))
 
    
Suppose the duration of the study is made up of   Quarters periods. A CDO   could be 
downgraded in any Quarter  , which implies that       or the study concludes without being 
downgraded, i.e.     , in other words, the CDO is censored.  
For the uncensored CDOs with      , the likelihood may be expressed in terms of the 
hazard as:  
 
  )             )
   (       
          ))       
   (       
            ))       ( 
              )) 
 
                        (        ))  ∏ (    (      )))
    
   
 
  
For the censored CDO,      (which implies     ), let us assume that       , then the 
likelihood can be expressed as:  
 
  )              )   (       )  ∏ (    (      )))
    







The likelihood for the full sample is: 
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Where      if the     CDO is uncensored and zero otherwise.   
  
The log likelihood function can then be expressed as:  
 
  )      ∑      (        ))  
 
   
∑ ∑    (    (      )))
    
   
 
   
 
  
In this study, there are five quarters:   {         }24 
 
1.6.2 Data 
The data consist of quarterly CDO variables from January 2008 to April 200. Section 
6.2.A reports the summary statistic of the CDOs that have had any of their tranches downgraded 
during this period and section 6.2.B reports the summary statistics of the CDOs that have had 
only its AAA tranches downgraded.  
 
1.6.2.A—Summary Statistic of the CDOs with any of their Tranches Downgraded 
Table 1.12 reports the average statistics of the differences
25
  in the Moody’s Deal Scores 
for the downgraded (D) and the non-downgraded (ND) CDOs in four Quarters. The trend shows 
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 The periods are from 1
st
 Quarter of 2008 to 1
st





that before the downgrading of the tranches occurred the Moody’s Deal Scores were revised 
upwards by Moody’s.   
 
Table 1.12 
This table reports the summary statistics of the averages of the differences of the Moody’s Deal 
Scores for the downgraded (D) and the non-downgraded (ND) deals. The differences are 
calculated as follows: in Quarter (2, 3, 4, and 5), the difference of the MDS,           
       , are calculated for both the downgraded and the non-downgraded deals. 
 
Quarter   ∆MDS 





















Table 1.13 reports the dynamics of the downgraded deals and the non-downgraded deals 
over the five Quarters. The percentage of the assets in the CDO portfolio that are rated at CCC or 
below (PR) is higher for the downgraded CDOs than the non-downgraded CDOs in all the 
quarters. The CDOs with higher weighted average maturity (WAM) were downgraded earlier 
than the other CDOs. The weighted average coupons (WAC) of the bond securities in the CDO 
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 The differences are calculated as follows: in Quarter (2, 3, 4, and 5), the difference of the MDS,      
            , are calculated for both the downgraded and the non-downgraded deals. The variables of the 
downgraded CDOs are not collected anymore after the Quarter in which it was downgraded; each Quarter presents 






portfolios are higher for the non-downgraded CDOS in all the Quarters. Likelihood of Defaults 
(represented by the WARF factor of the CDOs), did not exhibit the trend which was expected 








This table reports the summary statistics of variables for the downgraded CDOs (D) and non-
downgraded CDOs (ND). The values represent the average quarterly values from 01/2008 to 
03/2009. 
 
Quarter   CD WARF
26
 WAM PR WAS WAC 













































































1.6.2.B— Summary Statistic of the CDOs with Downgraded AAA Tranches 
 Table 1.14 reports the average statistic of the differences in the Moody’s Deal Scores for 
the downgraded (D) and the non-downgraded (ND) CDOs in four Quarters. The trend shows that 
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before the downgrading of the tranches occurred the Moody’s Deal Scores were revised upwards 
by Moody’s.   
 Table 1.15 reports the dynamics of the downgraded deals and the non-downgraded deals 
over the five Quarters. These dynamics are similar to 6.2.A (Tables 1.12 and 1.13), the case 
where any of the tranches of the CDOs were downgraded.  
 
Table 1.14 
This table reports the summary statistics of the averages of the differences of the Moody’s Deal 
Scores for the downgraded (D) and the non-downgraded (ND) deals. The differences are 
calculated as follows: at Quarter (2, 3, 4, and 5), the difference of the MDS,            
       , are calculated for both the downgraded and the non-downgraded deals. 
 
Quarter   ∆MDS 


































This table reports the summary statistics of variables for the downgraded CDOs (D) and non-
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 The WARF score is in thousands 
Time   WARF
27
 WAM PR WAS WAC   










































































1.6.3 Model Estimation 
 Jenkins (1995) described an easy estimation procedure for discrete duration models. He 
showed that the discrete proportional hazard model can be estimated using a regression model 
for a binary dependent variable. Following Jenkins (1995), we define a variable       if  
     and 
    , and      otherwise. For CDOs that do not have any of their tranche(s) 
downgraded in any Quarter,      for all the Quarters. For CDOs that have had any of their 
tranche(s) downgraded in any Quarter,  ,       for all the previous quarters except the 
quarter in which they were downgraded when      . Using this indicator variable, the log 
likelihood function can be rewritten as: 
  )             ∑ ∑        (       ))
  
   
 
 
   
∑ ∑    (    (      )))
    
   
 
   
 
 
 Equation (7) has the same form as the standard likelihood function for regression analysis 
of a binary variable with     as the dependent variable. This allows the discrete time hazard 
models to be estimated by binary dependent variable methods.  
The hazard function  (      )) is assumed to take the form: 
 
  )          (      ))  
 
          )       ) 
 
  
Where     ) is the baseline hazard function and is modeled by using dummy variables indexing 





1.6.4.1 Estimation Results of the Baseline Model for the CDOs with any of its Tranches 
Downgraded 
Table 1.16 





 Table 1.16 reports the estimation results for the discrete time hazard baseline model.  
Moody’s Deal Score (MDS) has a positive impact on the probability of downgrading, i.e. 
deals with higher MDS have higher hazard and hence shorter survival rate. Moody’s does not 
release information on what they take into account when calculating the scores for the CDO 
deals
28
. But it is reasonable to assume that Moody’s take into consideration some of the indexes 
that track the real estate market (e.g. Markit Indices and the Case-Shiller Composite-20 index) in 
their calculation; section 7 of the paper explores whether the changes in these indexes have 
impact on the changes in the Moody’s Deal Scores.   
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 Only 30% of the variations in the Moody’s Deal Scores could be explained by the other CDO variables in section 
6.2.   
Variables Coefficient Standard  
Errors 
P-Value 
Moody’s Deal Score 
(MDS)  
 0.803 0.038 0.000 
    
    ) -4.742 0.336 0.000 
    
    ) -4.879 0.339 0.000 
    
   ) -3.991 0.299 0.000 
    





The estimated coefficients on the duration dummy variables suggest that the hazard 
decreases from the first quarter to the second quarter, but rises afterwards.  
 
 




This table reports the estimation results for the Hazard rate for the full model with all the 
covariates.  





 0.033 0.014 0.018 
    
Likelihood of Defaults 
(WARF) 
-0.002 0.001 0.161 
    
Weighted Average Maturity 
(WAM) 
 0.112 0.091 0.217 
    
Weighted Average Coupon Rate  
(WAC) 
-0.247 0.099 0.012 
    
Percentage of CCC rated securities or below 
(PR) 
  0.173 0.076 0.022 
    
Weighted Average Spread 
(WAS) 
  1.052 0.667 0.115 
    
Moody’s Deal Score 
(MDS)  
  0.403 0.136 0.003 
    
   )  -5.067 0.803 0.000 
    
   )  -5.399 0.841 0.000 
    
   )  -5.636 0.692 0.000 
    
   )  -5.140 0.585 0.000 





  In the Full Model the Moody’s Deal Score (MDS) still has a positive impact on the 
probability of downgrading, but the effect is lower (0.803 vs. 0.403).  
The Collateral Diversification (CD) measures how correlated the assets in the CDO 
portfolio is. It is an important variable in the rating methodology of the CDOs; a higher CD score 
plays an important role in determining how many of the CDO tranches will be given higher 
ratings. From the estimation, CD scores have a positive impact on a probability of a deal being 
downgraded, i.e. deals with higher CD scores have a higher hazard rate, and hence shorter 
survival time. As Moody’s revise the initial CD scores downwards, it downgraded the tranches.  
  Portfolios with a higher percentage of CCC or lower rated underlying assets are likely to 
be downgraded during the crises because the underlying assets are most likely to default. These 
CCC and below assets also have lower recovery rates after default. As the results show, the 
percentage of CCC rated securities or below (PR) has a positive impact on the probability of 
downgrading, i.e. deals that have a higher percentage of their assets downgraded to CC or worse 
have higher hazard and hence shorter survival rate. Table 1.18 reports the average defaulted 
amount of the underlying assets of the downgraded and the non-downgraded deals, and the 
average loss of the defaulted assets, i.e. the amount that could not be recovered after the default.   
 
Table 1.18 
This table reports the average total value of the underlying assets, the average defaulted value, 
and the average defaulted amount loss of the downgraded and the non-downgraded CDO deals. 
 
Deals Par Value of the 
Deals 
Defaulted Par 
(% of par value) 
Defaulted Asset Loss 
(% of defaulted par) 

















The par value of the deals is the average total par value of the underlying assets of the 
CDOs. On average about 7% of the underlying asset of the downgraded deals and about 6.4% of 
the Non-downgraded deals defaulted, but only 41% of the defaulted assets were recovered while 
66% of the defaulted securities of the non-downgraded deals were recovered. Since the 
downgraded deals had a higher percentage of their underlying assets rated CCC or below, the 
table shows that the CDO managers were not able to recover as much compared to non-
downgraded deals which had a lower percentage of CCC assets when the assets defaulted.   
Although bonds with high coupon rates usually have high default rates, a high coupon 
rate bond with a short maturity usually has shorter duration as it receives more cash flows 
upfront. As Table 1.17 shows, Weighted Average Coupon Rate (WAC) has a negative impact on 
the probability of downgrading, i.e. deals with higher assets coupon rates have lower hazard and 
hence longer survival rate. In economic crises, CDO portfolios with more cash flows (or deals 
that have built up a sizable cash reserve from their earlier cash flows) are more likely to pass 
their overcollateralization and the interest coverage tests; as such they might be less likely to be 
downgraded.  
I find no effect of the Likelihood of Default (WARF), Weighted Average Maturity 
(WAM) and the Weighted Average Spread (WAS) on the survival of the CDOs. Theoretically an 
increase in the WARF (which should occur during financial crises as more of the underlying 
assets get downgraded) should increase the probability of the downgrade of the tranches. For any 
given CDO deal rated by Moody’s, hundreds of the underlying assets are rated by Moody’s and 
other rating agencies. The lack of clear upward trend of the WARF scores in Tables 1.13 and 
1.15 might indicate a delayed effect of Moody’s correctly updating the new ratings of the 





correctly reflect the riskiness of the underlying assets leading to an absence of any effect on the 
downgrading probability. From Table 1.13 the downgraded deals had a higher WAM than the 
non-downgraded deals for all the Quarters.  The absence of any effect of the WAM on the 
probability of the downgrade suggests that the average time left for the underlying assets to 
mature in the CDO portfolios was not as important as the quality of the assets. The market risk 
exposure for these long term maturity assets was not significant.  
 
1.6.4.3    Comparison of Baseline Model and Full Model  
 A comparison of the    of the Baseline (which has only the Moody’s Deal Scores (MDS) 
as the covariate) Model to the Full Model (which has the MDS and other CDO variables as the 
covariates) show that the changes in the MDS are the only variable that explains tranche 
downgrade.     
 
Table 1.19 
This table reports the statistic and p-value for the Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 











1.6.6 Non-Proportional Hazard 
 The hazard model postulated implicitly assumes that a predictor has an identical effect 
every time period. By interacting the time dummies    ) with the covariates in the hazard model 
we can show whether the effect of the covariates differs from time period to time period. A 





dummies was run. The results of the regression from the interaction term produced very few 
significant terms; only    )   and     )    were significant at 5% and we could not reject the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients of the interaction terms were jointly zero. This suggests that 
























1.6.7 Estimation Results for the Full Model for the CDOs with Downgraded AAA Tranches  
In both categories of downgrading the Moody’s Deal Scores plays a significant role in 
whether the tranches of the CDO deals would be downgraded or not.   
 
Table 1.20 
This table reports the estimation results for the Hazard rate when the tranche downgrade is 
restricted to only the AAA tranches 
 





 -0.098 0.037 0.008 
    
Likelihood of Defaults 
(WARF) 
 -0.005 0.004 0.133 
    
Weighted Average Maturity 
(WAM) 
 -0.055 0.142 0.698 
    
Weighted Average Coupon Rate  
(WAC) 
  0.886 0.528 0.093 
    
Percentage of CCC rated securities or below 
(PR) 
  0.327 0.258 0.204 
    
Weighted Average Spread 
(WAS) 
   0.265 1.482 0.858 
    
Moody’s Deal Score 
(MDS)  
   2.854 0.867 0.001 
    
   )    0.639 2.790 0.819 
    
   )   -2.900 2.635 0.271 
    
   )   -1.894 2.588 0.233 
    
   )   -2.574 2.219 0.246 








 In Section 6 we showed that the Moody’s Deal Score (MDS) significantly increases the 
hazard of downgrading of the CDO tranches.  Figures 4 to 9 shows the monthly trajectory of the 
MDS for a randomly selected six downgraded CDO deals included in the study. The first month 
is January 1
st
 2008 and the last month is April 30
th
 2009. For deals represented in Figures 1 to 5 
their MDS were raised months before their tranches were downgraded in the fourth quarter of 
2008. For the deal represented in Figure 6, it tranches where downgraded in the 1
st
 quarter of 
2009. All the CDOs had an increase in their MDS before their tranches were downgraded. Table 
1.21 also reports the quarterly differences of the Moody’s Deal Score for the downgraded and the 
non-downgraded deals from first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009 for both types of 
downgrading considered. As can be seen, the downgraded deals experience an increase in their 
Moody’s deal scores.   
Since CDOs are not traded on an exchange it is usually difficult to gauge the overall 
direction of the CDOs backed by real estate related assets. However, movements in the Markit 
ABX.HE indices (ABX.HE indices track CDS on US home equity loans (HEL)) and the Case-
Shiller Composite-20 index (Case-Shiller Home Price indexes measure the changes in the total 
value of all existing single-family housing stock) could be used as a proxy to gauge the overall 
direction of the real estate backed CDO market. Moody’s can, for instance, observe what is 
happening in the Markit ABH.HE (AA and A) tranches and the Case-Shiller Composite-20 index 
and adjust the scores they give to the CDOs accordingly. Since the lower tranches of a CDO 
offer “protection” to the upper tranches, looking at the movement in the ABX.HE AA tranche—





“protection” to both the AAA and AA tranches will inform Moody’s as to the level of  
“protection” the upper tranches of the CDOs have.   
  The Markit ABX indices and the Case-Shiller Composite-20 index also experienced 
significant changes during the period when the tranches of the CDOs were being downgraded the 
most (Figures 10 and 11).  Granger causality tests will be useful in investigating the causality 
link between Markit ABX indices and the Case-Shiller Composite-20 index Moody’s Deal 













































































































This table reports the summary statistics of the averages of the differences of Moody’s Deal 
Scores for the downgraded (D) and the non-downgraded (ND) CDOs. The differences are 
calculated as follows: at t (2, 3, 4, 5), the difference of the MDS,                  , are 



















Quarter     ∆MDS 
(Any tranche Downgrades) 
∆MDS 
(Only AAA Downgrades) 
 
       









       
3 Mean 
SD 
  0.07  2.02 




       
4 Mean 
SD 
  0.02  2.25 




       
5 Mean 
SD 
 0.96  1.33 










1.7.1 Estimation Method—Multivariate Panel Granger Causality Test 
  A stationary time series    is said to “Granger cause”     if—under the assumption that 
all other information is irrelevant—the inclusion of past values of    reduces the predictive error 
variance of   . Granger causality tests are carried out by regressing    on its own lags and on 
lags of   . If the lags of    are found to be to be statistically significant, then the null hypothesis 
that    does not Granger cause    can be rejected.  
Let us consider covariance stationary variables    and    observed on   periods and   
CDOs. For each individual CDO         and time        , we have the following 
heterogeneous autoregressive model: 
  )                  ∑        
 
   
 ∑ ∑   
     
 
 
   
 
   
     
where     represents the Moody’s Deal Scores of the CDOs. The individual effects    are 
assumed to be fixed. The     are the variables (Markit indices and Case-Shiller Composite-20 
index) that granger cause     
The autoregressive parameters   
 
 and the regression coefficients slopes   
 
 are assumed 
to be the same for all CDOs. However, for each cross section        , individual residuals 
             are i.i.d      
 ).    
 We can examine Granger causality from         by testing the null hypothesis: 
 
   )                   
    
      










1.7.2.A Markit ABX Indices 
Although Markit ABX.HE indices were not meant to be the barometer of the general risk 
associated with entire market of CDOs backed by real estate related assets, they have evolved to 
be the general measure of risk in the market. With the collapse of the sub-prime RMBS and CDO 
trading, the more liquid market for the ABX.HE indexed CDS has become an important 
benchmark for market pricing of sub-prime mortgage related securities.  
Credit Default Swaps (CDS)
29
 and indices on CDS have allowed market participants to 
transfer risk from one party to the other. The indices have allowed market participants to trade 
credit risk of reference entities without having to enter into multiple swap positions and without 
having to own the referenced obligation. The premiums on CDS contracts are believed to show a 
better measure of credit worthiness for corporations (or pool of assets like CDOs). Markit 
ABX.HE indices are the most prominent indices that track the price of CDS of mortgage backed 
security (MBS). The ABX.HE indices track CDS on US home equity loans (HEL) MBS. HELs 
include subprime residential mortgage loans, second lien mortgage loans, home equity line of 
credit (HELOCs), and high-loan to value (LTV) loans. HEL usually has a long maturity, so the 
maturity of the CDS contract tends to march that of the reference bond. The indices have risen to 
prominence during the recent financial turmoil; the collapse in their prices tracked perfectly the 
meltdown in the housing sector.  
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 A CDS is a derivative contract that works like an insurance policy against the credit risk of an asset or company. 







The first ABX.HE indices started trading
30
 on January 19, 2006 and are made up of 
equally weighted portfolios of 20 CDS backed by HEL MBS. Each ABX series is made up of 20 
new MBS deals issued during a six month period prior to the index formation. Due to this, the 
vintage indices could be different from newer indices as underwriting, credit enhancement and 
collateral standards change over time. The index series consists of five sub-series each 
referencing exposures to the same underlying HEL deals and their tranches. The sub-series are 
AAA (Moody’s Aaa), AA (Moody’s Aa2 and Aa1), A (Moody’s A2, A1 and Aa3), BBB 
(Moody’s Baa2, Baa1, and A3) and BBB- (Moody’s Baa3). The criteria used in selecting the 
deals are; large and liquid deals with at least $500 Million of deal size and an average FICO 
score set at 660 per deal. The index also limits the deals that could be included originating from 
the same servicer, and all the deals included should be rated by both Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s. The first series of the indices is ABX.HE.06-01 (issued in January 2006), the second 
series is ABX.HE.06-02 (issued in July, 2006), the third series is ABX.HE.2007-01 (issued in 
January, 2007) and the fourth series is ABX.HE.07-01 (issued in July, 2007). The ABX.HE.08-
01 series was supposed to be issued in January 2008 but was cancelled due to insufficient RMBS 
origination and trading.  
 One of the criticisms of the ABX indices is that since they are computed from a small 
fraction of deals issued on the market, they do not accurately reflect the overall risk in the 
housing market. For example, each series is made up of about $20 Billion worth of subprime 
mortgages, but the total outstanding vintage MBS of subprime quality from 2004-2008 is 
estimated to be around $600 Billion. This implies that each series is about 5% of the overall 
subprime MBS outstanding. Despite this limitation, there are no other indices that tracks the 
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 The trading volume on the first day was $5 billion. The market makers for the indexes are Bank of America, BNP 
Paribas, Deutsche Bank, Lehman brothers, Morgan Stanley, Barclays, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, RBS, Greenwich 






fluctuations in the real estate related asset backed structured finance products better than the 
ABX.HE indices.   
 The ABX.HE indices trade on price rather than spread terms with a predetermined fixed 
coupon
31
 which is determined prior to the launch of a new series. The protection buyer pays 
(usually monthly) the fixed rate amount over the life of the contract based on the current notional 
amount of the index. The index contract is not terminated when a credit event occurs (short fall 
of interest rate or principal), rather it continues with a reduced notional amount until maturity. 
 
7.2. B Case-Shiller Home Price Index 
The Case-Shiller Home Price Index indices are designed to measure the changes in the 
total value of all existing single-family housing stock. The index also tracks the overall direction 
of the housing market. Rating agencies might take the fluctuations of this index into an account 
when they are revising the ratings they have already given to the tranches of the CDOs backed 
by real estate related assets. The index is based on repeat-sales methodology
32
 developed by Karl 
Case and Robert Shiller. The repeat sales method uses data on properties that were sold at least 
twice, in order to capture the true appreciated value of constant-quality homes. The index 
computes a three month moving average of the repeat sales of single family houses in 20 
metropolitan
33
 (Composite-20 SPCS20R) areas based on Case et al (1993) repeat sale 
methodology. The method produces a cap-weighted index for residential real estate in nine US 
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 For example, the coupon rate for the AAA ABX.HE-06-1 is 18 bases point, i.e., to protect $1 million in value of 
AAA tranche, the protection buyer would pay $1,800 per year in monthly installment. The buyer pays more when 
the tranche trades at a discount.  
32
 This methodology is recognized as the most reliable means to measure housing price movements. For more 
information on the methodology, see 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/SP_Case_Shiller_Home_Price_Indices_FAQ.pdf 
33
 Boston, Chicago, Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami,  New York, San Diego, San Francisco, Washington, 






census regions. The national composite is then produced from the regional indices using census 
weight.  
1.7.3 Data 
Table 1.22 presents the monthly summary statistic of the Markit ABX.HE.AA-06, 
ABX.HE.A-06, and the Case- Shiller Composite index. The data is from January 2008 to May 
2009. Table 1.23 reports the correlation matrix of the variables. As can be seen from the table the 
Markit Indices and the Case-Shiller Composite-20 index are positively correlated with each 
other—0.975 between the AA index and Case-Shiller Index and 0.896 between the A index and 
the Case-Shiller index.  
 
Table 1.22 
This table reports the monthly summary statistic of the Markit Indices, Case-Shiller         
Composite Index and the Yield on the 10 year Treasury bond 
 
 Max Min Mean Standard 
Deviation 
     
AA 84 16.88 50.157 22.543 
     
A 60.33 7.5 23.922 15.215 
     




This table reports the correlation of the Markit Indices and the Case-Shiller Composite-20 
Index 
 
 AA A Case-
Shiller 
    
AA 1   
    
A 0.914 1  
    
Case-
Shiller 






Figure 10 graphs the trajectory of the Markit indices. Both the AA and the A indices have 
been on a downward trajectory since January 2008. However, the AA index experience the 
largest fall during the period.  
 
Figure 10 
This graph represents the trajectory of the Markit ABX.HE-06 AA, A and BBB indices from 
January 2008 to April 2009 
 




Figure 11 graphs the monthly trajectory of the Case-Shiller Composite-20 index. The 
index has also been on a downward trajectory; within this period we observe some of the lowest 
figures ever reported for the index.  Figure 12 graphs the distribution of the Moody’s Deal 
Scores from January 2009 to April 2008
34
. There are two clusters—the values less than 2 are the 
initial values that were given to the deals, and the values above 5 are the revised values that were 
given to the deals after Moody’s reassessment. The Moody’s Deal Scores ranges from -10 (best) 
to +10 (worst).   
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This graph represents the trajectory of the Case-Shiller Composite-20 index from January 2008 
to April 2009 





This graph represents the distribution of the Moody’s Deals Score for the CDOs from January 
2008 to April 2009 





































































































1.7.4 Empirical Results  
 We follow Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimation procedure which differences the 
model to get rid of the individual specific effects. This also gets rid of any endogeneity that may 
be due to the correlation of the individual effects and the right hand side regressors. The moment 
conditions utilize the orthogonality conditions between the differenced errors and lagged values 
of the dependent variable. This assumes that the original disturbances are serially uncorrelated. 
Based on the estimation results, a conclusion on causality will be reached by running Wald tests 
on the coefficients of the lagged    to check whether they are statistically different from zero.  
 Table 1.24 reports the results for estimating equation (9) using the Arellano-Bond system 
GMM estimator. Model 1 uses the Markit ABH.HE.06.AA as one of the    , while Model 2 uses 
ABH.HE.A-06 as one of the    . Both models use the Case-Shiller index as the other  . In Model 
1 the changes in the second lagged AA Markit index can predict the changes in the Moody’s 
Deal Scores. The first lagged AA Markit index does not seem to have an effect on the changes in 
the Moody’s Deal Scores. In model 2 both the first and second lagged A Markit indices can 
predict the changes in the Moody’s Deal Scores. Also, in both models the first lagged Case-
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Table 1.25 reports the results of testing the null hypothesis: 
      
    
      
                  
 
Table 1.25 
This Table reports the results for the null hypothesis 
 
 Statistic Chi-Squared (4) P-Value 
   
Model 1 144.68 0.000 
   
Model 2 137.68 0.000 
 
In both Models 1 and 2 the changes in the Markit ABX.HE indices and the Case-
Shiller Composite index Granger cause the Moody’s Deal Scores. This implies that 
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Moody’s take into account the movements in these indices to adjust the scores they 
assign to the CDOs deals backed by real estate related assets.  
 
1.7.5 Relative Importance of Markit ABX.HE and Case-Shiller Composite-20 Index  
 This section discusses how much of the variation in the Moody’s Deals Scores (MDS) is 
explained by the Markit ABX.HE indices and the Case-Shiller Composite-20 index if we assume 
that Moody’s based its revision of the Moody’s Deal Scores solely on these two indexes.  
 
   )                                      
 
where     represents the Moody’s Deal Scores and      represents the Case-Shiller 
Composite-20 index.  The residual    is assumed to be independent of the Case-Shiller index 
and it is also assumed to be independently distributed.   
In other to check the relative importance of the Markit ABX.HE indices and the Case-
Shiller Composite-20 index in explaining the changes in the MDS, we also estimate this equation: 
 
   )                                                        
where      represents Markit ABH.HE.06.AA and ABH.HE.06.A indices. The residual 
    is assumed to be independent of the Markit and Case-Shiller indices and it is also assumed to 
be independently distributed.  
Equations    ) and (12) are distributed lags models. Table 1.26 reports the adjusted-
    for equation (11) and (12). The    ’s indicate that the changes in the Case-Shiller 
Composite-20 index explains most of the variation in the Moody’s Deal Scores; adding the 












































































 The collapse of the market for CDOs backed by real estate related assets has caused 
severe disruptions in the housing and financial markets. It is now much more difficult to package 
newly originated mortgage loans to be sold to CDO managers. The mortgage packaging frenzy 
of the 2002 to 2006 years left little time for thorough examination of the quality of these loans 
which were being packaged into CDOs. The waves of CDO tranche downgrades have prompted 
a review of the underlying assets of the CDO portfolios.  This paper documents some of the 
characteristic of the underlying assets of the CDOs which might have contributed to the 
downgrades of the CDO tranches. The underlying assets (which were mostly mortgage loans 
related assets) of the CDO portfolios were not seasoned. These unseasoned loans defaulted in 
significant numbers during the economic recession. Also, a sizable percentage of the underlying 
assets were of low quality assets which defaulted in bigger numbers during the economic crises.   
 The paper uses a discrete hazard rate model to study the variables that contributed the 
most to the downgrading of the tranches of the CDO deals.  The empirical results showed that 
the Moody’s Deal Score, the default correlation of the underlying assets, the percentage of the 
underlying assets of the CDO portfolios rated at CCC or below and the Weighted Average 
Coupon rate of the assets in the CDO portfolio were all important in determining whether the 
tranches of the CDOs would be downgraded or not.  However, the changes in the Moody’s Deal 
Scores impacted the downgraded probabilities the most. During the crises Moody’s revised the 
initial values of the Moody’s Deal Scores it gave to the CDO deals leading to mass downgrades 
after the revision. A causality test showed that in revising the initial Moody’s Deal Scores giving 
to the deals, Moody’s took into account the changes in the Markit ABX.HE.AA-06 and 







Dynamics of Unemployment and Home Price Shocks on Mortgage 
Default Rates 
2.1 Introduction 
The traditional model of mortgage default posits that borrowers default if and only if they 
have negative equity. A classic example is the option-based mortgage default model examined 
by Foster and Van Order (1984) in which default is a put option. Borrowers would exercise the 
put option when the value of the house plus any costs of exercising the option falls below the 
mortgage value. However, recent studies
36
 have shown that many borrowers with negative equity 
do not necessarily default. These borrowers continue to honor their contractual obligation to the 
lenders even though their houses are worth less than the loans outstanding. These studies found 
that default is often associated with a negative income shock; i.e. being unemployed usually is a 
bigger factor than negative equity. Foote et al. (2009) found that a 1% increase in the 
unemployment rate raises the probability of default by 10-20%, while a 10% point fall in housing 
prices raises the probability of default by more than 50%. On the other hand, there have also 
been documented cases where borrowers have exercised the option to default when they have 
negative equity even though they could afford to pay their mortgages. Ashworth et al. (2010) 
concluded that negative equity shocks are far more important predictor of mortgage defaults than 
unemployment shocks. However, they also found that employment shocks can amplify the 
default rate if the borrower has already experienced a negative equity shock. As Mayer et al 
(2009) showed areas that experienced increased unemployment rates also experienced decline in 
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house prices. As such, it is not easy to establish whether defaults in these areas are due to 
unemployment or house prices.  
In this paper, we attempt to disentangle the interrelations between the home price index 
(which tracks housing prices) and unemployment shocks and mortgage default rates by studying 
the dynamics of these two shocks on mortgage default rates from 1979 to 2010. The 2001 to 
2010 period represents a time when there have been significant changes in unemployment, house 
price indices and mortgage default rate at the same time. As such, this period presents a perfect 
period to empirically test which of these two shocks have had a bigger impact on mortgage 
default rates. We also want to know how the dynamics of the impacts of these two shocks in 
2001 to 2010 have deviated from their historical dynamics (1979 to 2000). Not only have there 
been significant changes in these three variables during the 2001 to 2010 period, underwriting 
standards also deteriorated significantly during the period as the growing number of subprime 
loans originated during this period shows. Incentives in the mortgage market also shifted to the 
“originate-to-distribute” model, under which mortgage brokers originated loans and then sold 
them to institutions that securitized them.  Because these brokers do not have to bear the cost of 
default, they may not be stringent in screening potential mortgage borrowers (Keys, Mukherjee, 
Seru, and Vig, 2008). About 700,000 subprime mortgage loans
37
 were originated annually 
between 1998 and 2000 (Mayer and Pence, 2009); this increased to an average of 1.5 million 
between 2003 and 2006 annual. Lax underwriting standards were not the only factor in the 
increase in origination of subprime loans. A contributing factor was the house price appreciation 
after 2001 which made subprime origination easier as homeowners could easily resell their 
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 Subprime loans are usually targeted to borrowers who have bad credit, little savings available for a downpayment 






homes. Mayer and Pence (2009) documented that areas with high house price appreciation also 
experienced an increase in subprime mortgage origination.  
Given the different composition of mortgage borrowers and the different types of 
mortgage loans originated during the two periods, a study of the impact of the unemployment 
and home price shocks on mortgage defaults over these two periods is necessary.  
Mortgage default rates are influenced by the unemployment and home price shocks at the 
national, regional and state levels. However, describing the joint behavior of these three variables 
is not easy.  This paper utilizes a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) to decompose the 
national, regional and state mortgage default rates into unemployment and home price index 
shocks. The data consist of unemployment rates, home price indices and mortgage default rates 




  levels covering a period from 1979 to 2010 at a quarterly 
frequency.  The mortgage default rate is defined as the number of seriously delinquent mortgage 
loans as a percentage of all loans serviced in each quarter. The seriously delinquent loans are 
mortgage loans that are 90+ delinquent, i.e., they are loans for which the borrowers have not paid 
the mortgage in 90+ days.  
We first fit the SVAR model to the 1979 to 2000 national and regional data and forecast 
the changes in the national and regional mortgage default rates for the 2001 to 2010 period. Not 
only are we interested in how well the model performs out-of-sample, we are more interested in 
its performance during the housing boom years of 2003 to 2006, and also during the recent Great 
Recession from 2008 to 2010. We examine the forecast errors from 2001 to 2010 and explore 
some of the factors that might have contributed to the model not fitting the data well during the 
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Great Recession. We test for a structural break in the mortgage defaults rates during 2008 to 
2010.    
We then also estimate the model for the 2001 to 2010 sample and estimate the implied 
impulse response functions from the identification for both the 1979 to 2000 and 2001 to 2010 
periods for the national, regional and state data. This allows us to examine whether there have 
been changes in the dynamics of the home price index and unemployment shocks on mortgage 
default for both periods. Finally, we measure the importance of the two shocks in explaining the 
changes in the mortgage default rate by performing variance decomposition for both sample 
periods.  
The forecasted changes in the national and regional mortgage default rates from 2001 to 
2010 using estimated results from fitting the SVAR model to the 1979 to 2000 sample were not 
far off from the actual changes in the mortgage default rates from 2001 to 2007. The model did 
well even during the housing boom years of 2003 to 2006. However, the model failed to forecast 
the changes in the mortgage default rates during the Great Recession. There has been a structural 
break in the national and regional mortgage default rates during the 2008 to 2010 period which 
could not have been anticipated by the model.   
The empirical results also show that unemployment and home price index shocks on 
average had very little impact on mortgage default rate at the national, regional and state level 
during the 1979 to 2000 period. At the national level, an increase of one standard deviation in the 
unemployment and home price index led to an increase of 1.3% and a decrease of 1% in the 
mortgage default rate respectively during this period. At the regional level, the unemployment 
and the home price index shocks produced on average an increase of 1.2% and a decrease of 






in the national unemployment and the home price index shocks during this period led to an 
increase of 7.2% and a decrease of 4.9% respectively in the national mortgage default rate.  At 
the regional level, there was an average increase of 12.9% for the unemployment shock and an 
average decrease of 7.3% for the home price index shock during this period. The divergence of 
the national and regional estimates in the 2001 to 2010 period is due to the strong effect of the 
shocks in the West South Central, East South Central and East North Central regions.  
On average, the unemployment shocks seem to have had a bigger impact on the mortgage 
default rate than the home price index shocks.   
Also during the 2001 to 2010 period, the unemployment shocks explained on average 
about 43% of the variation in the regional mortgage default rate, while the home price index 
shocks explained on average about 20% of the variation in the regional mortgage default rate.  In 
effect, these two shocks were responsible on average for about 60% of the movement in the 
regional mortgage default rates during this period. The two shocks explained very little of the 
variation in the mortgage default rate during the 1979 to 2001 period.  
The results indicate that the dynamic response of the mortgage default rate to 
unemployment and home price index shocks changed at the national, regional and state levels 
after 2000. Although there have been periods of higher national, regional and state 
unemployment during the 1979 to 2000 period, they seemed to not have impacted the mortgage 
default rates that much during this period. Except for the Pacific region, California and Florida, 
unemployment shocks have had a bigger impact on the national, regional and state mortgage 
default rates and can also explain more of the variation in the mortgage default rates than the 
home price index shocks during the 2001 to 2010 period. The post 2000 results could be 






to unemployment and negative home price shocks. These borrowers have little savings they 
could use to cushion them against unemployment and negative home price shocks. Mayer et al 
(2009), Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008) and Mian and Sufi (2009) also documented declining 
underwriting standards as a factor in mortgage default crises.  
The paper proceeds as follows; Section 2 describes the SVAR model. Section 3 describes 
the data used. Section 4 provides the results for the forecast errors from 2001 to 2010 and the 
structural break tests. Section 5 provides the results for the impulse response functions and the 
variance decompositions for the 1979 to 2000 and 2001 to 2010 periods. Section 6 provides 
results for the impulse response functions and variance decompositions of the selected states. 
Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.2 SVAR Model  
The goal of the empirical analysis is to assess the impact of unemployment and home price index 
shocks on mortgage default rates. The SVAR system can be represented as:  
 




]    [
    
    
    
]      [
    
    









where    denotes the first difference of mortgage default rate,    denotes the first difference of 
unemployment rate and    denotes the first difference of the home price index. Each     is a 












]    . Equation (1) can then be written as  
 






The innovations          ) and  [    
 
]     for all    . Multiplying equation (2) by 
matrix , equation (2) can then be represented as: 
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Where   is the lag operator,           are     matrices of parameters, and    is a     
vector of orthogonalized disturbances: i.e.           ) and  [    
 
]     for all    .  
It is usually better to transform     into mutually uncorrelated innovations before we can 
effectively analyze the effect of one time increase in the     element of    on the     element 
of   . Let  be a matrix such that:    
     . Then40  {      ( 
     )
 
}     
and {        }  . These transformations of the innovations allow us to analyze the 
dynamics of the system in terms of a change to an element of   .   
2.1 Short-Run Identification  
In a short-run SVAR model, identification is obtained by placing restrictions on        
matrices which are assumed to be nonsingular. At least 3 identifying restrictions are needed to be 
imposed to achieve unique identification. We impose restrictions on the SVAR system by 
applying equality constraints with the constraint matrices:  
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Because               )
 , the identification scheme implies that changes in the 
unemployment rates are not contemporaneously affected by the changes in the home price 
indices and the mortgage default rates. It also implies that changes in the mortgage default rates 
are affected by the contemporaneous changes in the unemployment rates (if      ) but not the 
house price indices. Finally, it also implies that changes in the home price indices (if      ) 
are affected by contemporaneous changes in the unemployment rates and the mortgage default 
rates (if      ).  
 
Contemporaneous Effects 
                
We have enough restrictions that the innovations and the associated unique impulse 
responses are just-identified. We believe this identification strategy is reasonable: unemployed 
borrowers will experience difficulties paying their mortgages thereby leading to an increase in 
the default rate in the same quarter that they were unemployed, but borrowers who experience a 
negative equity do not make the decision to default in the same quarter. The second part was 
motivated by Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000), which empirically tested some mortgage 
default theories and found that borrowers do not default as soon as home equity becomes 
negative; they prefer to wait since default is irreversible and house prices may increase.  
Unemployment 







2.3 Data   
The nine census regions are: Pacific Census Division (P), Mountain Census Division 
(MT), West North Central (WNC), West South Central (WSC), East North Central (ENC), East 
South Central (ESC), New England (NE), Middle Atlantic (MA) and South Atlantic (SA)
41
. The 
states are Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, Nevada, and Pennsylvania.  
The mortgage default rate is defined as the total number of seriously delinquent mortgage 
loans as a percentage of all loans serviced in each quarter. The seriously delinquent loans are 
mortgage loans that are in 90+ delinquent, i.e., they are loans for which the borrowers have not 
paid the mortgage in 90+ days. The data is obtained from Mortgage Bankers Association 
National Delinquent Survey. The data consist of quarterly mortgage default rates from the 
second quarter of 1979 to the third quarter of 2010 for the national, 9 census regions and 6 states.  
The house price indices data were obtained from The Federal Housing Agency House 
Price Indices (HPI)
42
.  The indices are constructed from quarterly house price using data on 
conventional conforming mortgage transactions obtained from the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). The 
HPI measures broadly the movement of single-family house prices. It is a weighted, repeat-sales 
index, meaning that it measures average price changes in repeat sales or refinancing on the same 
properties. This information is obtained by reviewing repeat mortgage transactions on single-
family properties whose mortgages have been purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie 
Mac since January 1975.   
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 There are other House Price Indices, (e.g. Case-Shiller Indices) which could have been used. The HPI is used here 






The unemployment rates were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
2.4 Empirical Results   
This section discusses the results of the forecast errors from 2001 to 2010 for the regional 
and national mortgage default rates using the SVAR estimates from 1979 to 2000.  
 
2.4.1 Forecast Errors of Mortgage Default Rate: 2001 to 2010 Period 
Given the SVAR system: 
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The optimal        forecast (after  ) of the system is given by: 
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The forecast error for the mortgage default rate is represented as: 
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Where     
  is the national and regional mortgage default rate observed at time     
and  ̂ 
   ) is the forecasted national and regional mortgage default rate at time   .  
Figures
44
 1 to 4 represent the graphs of the forecast errors for the national and New 
England, East South Central and Mountain regions. The SVAR model was not far off in 
forecasting the changes in the national and regional mortgage default rates from 2001 to 2007. 
The big deviations in the forecast errors from 2006 to 2007 for the national and East South 
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Central—which are also present in the forecast error graph for West South Central—are due to 
the effects of Hurricane Katrina. The model did a good job in forecasting the changes in the 
mortgage default rate even in the housing boom years from 2003 to 2006. However, the model 
failed during the Great Recession period (2008 to 2010). Section 4.2 explores some of the 
















Given that the unemployment and negative shocks reinforce each other, a second model 
specification where unemployment rate was interacted with the home price index was tried, but it 
failed to improve the forecasted default rates from 2001 to 2010.  
 
2.4.2 Possible Reason for the Poor Fit during the Great Recession  
(A) Joint Structural Break Test 
A possible explanation for the poor performance of the model during the Great Recession 
is that there might have been a structural change in the trivariate system during this period which 
the model could not have anticipated.   
This section outlines a procedure for testing for such a structural break. The test is based 
on Lutkepohl (1989).  
Let the optimal         forecast error of the SVAR system be represented as:  
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  The    is the coefficient of the canonical MA 
representation of   ; Equation (13)
45
. Because               ), the forecast error is a 
linear transformation of a multivariate normal distribution and,  
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   )46        is the forecast MSE matrix.  
 
The optimal               are also jointly normal: 
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As was shown in Lutkepohl (2005)
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Where 3 represents the numbers of endogenous variables in the SVAR.  The test assumes 
that              are generated by the same       )  process that generated 
the             .  ̂  test the null hypothesis that      is generated by the same Gaussian 
      ) process that generated        .   
The SVAR model is estimated from 1979 to 2007 period and the mortgage default rate is 
forecasted for the period 1
st
 quarter of 2008 to 3
rd
 quarter of 2010 (11 quarters). Table 2.1 
presents the results of the test together with the  -values. The  -value is the probability that the 
test statistic assumes a value greater than the observed test value, if the null hypothesis is true. 
The results show that with the exception of East North Central region there does not seem to be a 
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Appendix B has more details  
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This table reports the test statistic and the p-values for the joint structural break tests for the 
mortgage default rate, the unemployment rate and the home price index for the national and 9 
regions. The estimation of the model (equation 3) is done using data from 1979 to 2008, and the 
forecast for the default rate, unemployment and home price index is from 2008 to 2010 (the 













(B) Individual Structural Break Test 
Lutkepohl (1989) showed that the power of a test based on joint variables may be lower 
than the power of a test based on the individual variables. Therefore we also run structural break 
tests for the national and regional mortgage default rates for the 2001 to 2010 period
48
.   
 Suppose that the mortgage default rates follow an          )  stochastic process 
represented as: 
 
   )            )      )   
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 We know from the analysis of the forecast errors that, if there is a structural break in the mortgage default rate it 
will occur post 2000.  
National and Regions  
 ̂  
Test Statistic p-values 
National 
East North Central 
East South Central 
Middle Atlantic  
Mountain 
New England  
Pacific 
South Atlantic 
West North Central 


























Where   is the lag operator,     )             
 
 and   )          
   
 .    is a Gaussian white noise with variance   
 .   
The MA representation is  
   )              )   
 
Where    )  
   )
   )
 ∑    
  
    
 
A test statistic to test for a structural break is constructed as follows: Let the sum of 
squared residuals of the estimation of Equation (11) using data from 1979 to 2007 be represented 
as   ̂            , and let the sum of squared residuals using data from 1979 to 2010 be 
represented as  ̂             . Then a test for structural break in the mortgage default rate from 
2008 to 2010 is: 
 
   )           
  ̂              ̂                
  ̂                  
          )  
 
Where   is the number of observations from 2008 to 2010,   is the number of observations 
from 1979 to 2007 and      , the number of parameters to be estimated.  
 Table 2.2 presents the results of the structural break test together with the  -values. The 
results show that there has been a structural break in the national and regional mortgage default 
rates during 2008 to 2010. This break in the mortgage default rates accounts for the huge 
deviations in the forecast errors observed during the Great Recession (2008 to 2010). The SVAR 






mortgage default rates from 2001 to 2010 could not have anticipated this structural change. The 
graphs of the national and regional mortgage default rates (Appendix D) show that there was not 




This table reports the test statistic and the p-values for the individual structural break test for the 
mortgage default rate of the national and 9 regions. The estimation of the model (Equation 11)
49
 














2.5 Analysis of the Dynamics of the Unemployment and Home Price Index 
shocks on the Mortgage Default Rate (National and Regional):  
1979 to 2000 vs. 2001 to 2010 
 
In this section we evaluate the impact of the home price index and unemployment shocks 
on the mortgage default rates by examining the impulse response functions and the variance 
decomposition from 1979 to 2000 and also from 2001 to 2010. Not only are we interested in the 
dynamics of the two shocks on the mortgage default rates during both periods; we also want to 
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 The exact specification of the model for the national and the 9 regions are presented in Appendix C 
National and Regions Test Statistic ( ) p-value 
National 
East North Central 
East South Central 
Middle Atlantic  
Mountain 
New England  
Pacific 
South Atlantic 
West North Central 
West South  Central 
    8.431 
  11.439 
  30.078 
27.557 
  7.104 
18.327 
  8.124 
17.479 
  4.050 
















assess the relative importance of the shocks in explaining the variation in the mortgage default 
rates.  
 
2.5.1 Orthogonalized Impulse Response  
An MA representation of equation (3) based on    is given by: 
 
   )                                  ∑      
 
   
 
 
Where   [      
     
      
 ]
  
                       )  The elements 
of the   matrices represent the responses to    shocks.  
   
2.5.2 Variance Decomposition 
A variance decomposition is performed to measure the contribution of the home price 
and unemployment shocks to the changes in default rates.  Using equation (13), the error optimal 
       ahead forecast at time     ̂      is: 
 
   )               ̂      ∑         
   
   
 
 Denoting the       element of    by      , then the        forecast error of the 
     component of        )becomes: 
   )               )   ̂     )   ∑(         
               
 )
 







Thus the forecast error of the     component consists of all the innovations:    
    
  and   
 .  
Because the   
    are uncorrelated and have unit variances, the mean square error of  ̂     )   
can then be expressed as: 
   )              ̂     )  )  ∑(     
          
 )
 
   
 
 
The contribution     ) of the     component to the MSE of the h-step ahead forecast of the 
    component is  
   )             )  
∑      
    
   
     ̂      )
 
 
This is the proportion of the         forecast error variance error of variable   
accounted for by   
    
  and   
  innovations. We focus here on the proportion of the forecast 
error variance of the mortgage default rate accounted by the unemployment and home price 
index shocks.  
 
2.5.3 Home Price Index and Unemployment Data: 2000 to 2010   
 The 2000 to 2010 period represents a time of significant changes in unemployment and 
house prices. Table 2.3 presents the percentage appreciation and depreciation of the house price 
index at the national and regional levels from 2000 to 2010.
50
 The table shows some variations 
across the regions of the extent of house price appreciation and depreciation during this period. 
House prices in the Pacific region had the largest appreciation and also the largest depreciation 
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 This period was chosen because it has the highest home price index and also the period when the index 
depreciated (measuring from the peak value) the most. The window is wide enough to observe the scale of house 






during this period. There has not being significant house price depreciation in the West North 
Central, West South Central and East South Central regions. The East North Central region had 
the smallest house price appreciation but one of the largest house price depreciation. Housing 




This table reports the maximum House Price Index appreciation and the minimum House Price 
Index depreciation from 1
st






National and Regions House Price Index 
Appreciation % 
House Price Index 
Depreciation % 
National 
East North Central 
East South Central  
Middle Atlantic  
Mountain 
New England  
Pacific 
South Atlantic 
West North Central  























Table 2.4 also reports the lowest and highest national and regional unemployment rates 
during 2001 to 2010. The table shows that there were significant increases in the unemployment 
rates both at the national and regional level during this period. East North Central and East South 
Central regions have their highest unemployment rates above the highest national unemployment 
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 National [Peak (1
st
 qtr. 2007)]: ENC [Peak (1
st
 qtr. 2007): ESC [Peak (1
st
 qtr. 2008)]: MA [Peak (1
st
 qtr. 2007)]:  
MT [Peak (2
rd
 qtr. 2007)]: NE [Peak (1
st
 qtr. 2007):  P [Peak (4
th
 qtr. 2006)]: SA [Peak (1
st
 qtr. 2007)]: WNC [Peak 
(2
nd
 qtr. 2007)]: WSC [Peak (2
nd
 qtr. 2008)]. For the national and all the regions the minimum house price index 
depreciation after the peak occurred during the 2
nd






rate. The two tables show that there were significant changes in house price indices and 
unemployment rates during this period. This presents a perfect sample to test the relative 
significance of home price index and unemployment shocks on the mortgage default rate.  
 
Table 2.4 
This table reports the lowest and highest national and regional unemployment rates 2001 to 













2.5.4 Impulse Response Functions 
 This section presents the results of the impulse response functions for the mortgage 
default for the 1979 to 2000 and 2001 to 2010 samples.  
Figures 5 to 8 represent the dynamics of the impulse response functions of the mortgage 
default rates for the national, East South Central, West North Central and Middle Atlantic 
regions
52
 respectively to an increase of one standard deviation in the home price index and the 
unemployment rate. In response to the unemployment shocks, the national and regional mortgage 
default rates increase and they take about 15 quarters after the shocks to get back to their pre 
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 The dynamics of the other regions are similar to those reported here.  
National and Regions Lowest Unemployment rate  Highest unemployment rate  
National 
East North Central 
East South Central  
Middle Atlantic  
Mountain 
New England  
Pacific 
South Atlantic 
West North Central  
West South Central 
4.2 (1
st
 qtr. 2001) 
4.3 (1
st
 qtr. 2001) 
4.6 (1
st
 qtr. 2001) 
4.1 (1
st
 qtr. 2001) 
3.2 (1
st
 qtr. 2007) 
3.3 (1
st
 qtr. 2001) 
4.6 (1
st
 qtr. 2007) 
4.0 (2
nd
 qtr. 2006) 
3.3 (1
st
 qtr. 2001) 
4.1 (1
st
 qtr. 2008) 
9.9 (4
th
 qtr. 2009) 
11.1 (4
th
 qtr. 2009) 
10.7 (4
th
 qtr. 2009) 
9.1 (4
th
 qtr. 2009) 
9.2 (1
st
 qtr. 2010) 
8.6 (4
th
 qtr. 2009) 
9.7 (4
th
 qtr. 2009) 
9.6 (4
th
 qtr. 2009) 
6.5 (2
nd
 qtr. 2009) 
7.7 (1
st






shock level. The home price shocks are unchanged in the period of impact because of our 
identification scheme, which implied that it takes more than a quarter for the home price index 
shocks to have an impact on the mortgage default rates. In response to the home price index 
shocks the national and regional mortgage default rates decrease and they also take about 15 
quarters to get back to their pre-shock levels. The national and regional mortgage default 
dynamics after the shocks seem to be similar; however, there are regional variations in the peaks 
and troughs of the impulse response functions.      
Table 2.5 reports the peak and trough of the national and regional mortgage default rates 
after the unemployment and home price index shocks. From 1979 to 2000 the national 
unemployment and home price index shocks led to a maximum increase of 1.3% and a decrease 
of 1% in the national mortgage default rates respectively. For the regions, the unemployment and 
home price index shocks led to an average increase of 1.2% and a decrease of 1.1% in the 
regional mortgage default rate respectively. Compared to the 2001 to 2010 period, the national 
unemployment and the home price index shocks led to maximum increase of 7.2% and a 
decrease of 4.9% in the national mortgage default rate respectively. For the regions, the 
unemployment and the home price index shocks led to an average increase of 12.7% and a 
decrease of 7.3% respectively. The unemployment changes during 1979 to 2000 at the national 
and regional levels did not seem to have impacted the national and regional mortgage default 
rates that much. The results for the home price index during this period are not surprising 
because the indices did not change much during the period.  
For the 2001 to 2010 period, the unemployment results for the East South Central (which 
had one of the highest unemployment rates at 11.1%) and West South Central (influenced by 






regions were among the regions with the smallest house price index appreciation and 
depreciation (Table 2.3); however the house price shocks seem to have generated a big impact on 
the mortgage default rates.  
Overall the response to the unemployment shocks is larger than the response to the home 
price index shocks.  
  
Table 2.5 
This table reports the peak and trough of the impulse response functions of the national and 
regional mortgage default rates due to a one standard deviation increase in the national and 




1979 to 2000 2001 to 2010 
Unemployment Price Index Unemployment Price Index 
% % % % 
National 
East North Central 
East South Central  
Middle Atlantic  
Mountain 
New England  
Pacific 
South Atlantic 
West North Central  
West South Central  
           1.3 
           1.9 
           1.4 
           1.1 
           1.0 
           1.2 
           0.6 
           0.7 
           1.4 











               7.2 
             11.4 
             18.0 
               6.9 
             10.4 
               8.4 
               5.9 
               9.1 
               5.4 
             39.0 
  -4.9 
  -6.0 
-12.5 
  -5.1 
  -5.9 
  -5.6 
  -5.7 
  -7.8 
  -3.7 

















2.5.5 Variance Decomposition 
To gauge the relative contributions of the unemployment and the home price index 
shocks to the variance of the mortgage default rates during both the 1979 to 2000 and the 2001 to 
2010 periods; the variance decompositions are constructed for the SVAR system using Equation 
(17) at          ) and               )53. Table 2.6 presents the results of the variance 
decomposition.  Again in this case also, the unemployment and home price index shocks do not 
explain much of the variation in the forecast errors of the mortgage default rates at both the 
national and regional levels for the 1979 to 2000 period.  Although there are some regional 
variations in the impact of the unemployment and home price index shocks during the 2001 to 
2010 period, on average, employments shocks explain a larger percentage in the movement of 
the mortgage default rates than the home price index shocks. The unemployment shocks explain 
about 44% of the movement in the mortgage default rates at           )  and 43%    
           ). While the home price index shocks explains about 13% at           ) and 
20%               ). In effect, the two shocks are responsible on average for about 60% of 
the movement in the regional mortgage default rates.  
The empirical results show that unemployment shocks have been a bigger contributor to 
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 As   increases, the decomposition of the variance of the forecasting error coincides with the decomposition of the 








This table reports the variance decompositions, equation (17), of the national and regional  
mortgage default rates for  1979 to 2000 and 2001 to 2010 samples for            ) and   
             ). The decompositions are expressed in percentages.  
 
National and Regions 1979 to 2000 2001 to 2010 
Unemployment  Price Index Unemployment  Price Index 
                                
National 
East North Central 
East South Central  
Middle Atlantic  
Mountain 
New England  
Pacific 
South Atlantic 
West North Central  
West South Central  
    4.7         4.2 
    5.0         5.1 
    3.3         3.4 
    3.4         3.3  
    3.3         3.7   
    2.3         2.6 
    1.3         2.1   
    2.1         2.1 
    5.0         5.1 
    2.6         2.5 
   3.5        3.6  
   2.3        2.7  
   4.0        4.5 
   0.2        0.2  
   5.1        5.3 
   1.9        2.2 
   3.4        5.0 
   2.0        2.1 
   0.7        0.7 
   3.6        3.6 
    32            31 
    56            51 
    37            37 
    38            38 
    61            57 
    36            39 
    23            22 
    43            38 
    42            39 
    63            63 
     7          12 
   11          14 
   11          12 
   14          24 
   14          22 
   15          21 
   26          41 
   20          30 
   11          14 
     4            4 
 
 
2.6 Dynamics of Some Selected States  
The dynamics of the home price index and unemployment shocks on the mortgage 
default rates were examined for Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, Nevada, and 
Pennsylvania. These states have had mortgage default rates higher than the national average. 
Some of the states (Michigan, Nevada and Pennsylvania) have also had unemployment rates 
higher than the national average. Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan and Nevada have also 










2.6.1 Home Price Index and Unemployment Data: 2000 to 2010   
 From Table 2.7 Florida had the largest appreciation in the house price index from 2000 to 
2010 and also one of the largest house price index depreciations during the period. Michigan had 
one of the lowest appreciations in the house price index, but also one of the largest house price 
index depreciation during the period. Nevada had the largest depreciation in the home price 
index. Michigan had the smallest home price appreciation but a large home price index 
depreciation. There does not seem to be have been much depreciation in housing prices in 
Pennsylvania.  Mayer and Pence (2009), document that areas with high house price appreciation 
experienced an increase in subprime mortgage origination. Mayer et al (2009) also showed that 
in California, Florida, Arizona and Nevada over half of subprime borrowers had negative equity 
in their home and over a third of borrowers in Michigan had negative equity by mid-2008.   
 
Table 2.7 
This table reports the maximum House Price Index appreciation and the minimum House Price 
Index depreciation from 1
st
 quarter 2000 to 3
rd
 Quarter 2010.  
 
States House Price Index 
Appreciation % 





















Table 2.8 also reports the lowest and highest state unemployment rates during this period. 
The results show that there have been significant increases in the unemployment rates for these 
states during this period. With the exception of Pennsylvania, all the states have their highest 







index depreciation than the national. Again, these states present a perfect sample to test the 
relative significance of home price index and unemployment shocks on the mortgage default 
rate. 
Table 2.8 
This table reports the lowest and highest state unemployment rates 2001 to 2010. The dates for 
the lowest and highest values are provided in the brackets.   
 
2.6.2 Impulse Response Functions 
This section presents the results of the impulse response functions for the mortgage 
default for the 1979 to 2000 and 2001 to 2010 samples.  
Figures 9 to 14 represents the dynamics of the impulse response functions of the 
mortgage default rates for the states to an increase of one standard deviation in the home price 
index and the unemployment rate. The dynamics of the states’ mortgage default rates after the 
unemployment and home price shocks are similar to the dynamics of the national and regional 
mortgage default rates after the shocks. That is, in response to the unemployment shocks the 
states mortgage default rates increase and they take about 15 quarters after the shocks to get back 
to its pre shock level. The home price shocks are also unchanged in the period of impact due to 
the implication of our identification scheme. In response to the home price index shocks the 
states mortgage default rates decrease and for some of the states it takes about 20 quarters to get 
back to their pre shock level during the 2001 to 2010 period. However, for these selected states 









 qtr. 2007) 
4.8 (3
rd
 qtr. 2006) 
3.3 (2
nd
 qtr. 2006) 
4.7 (1
st
 qtr. 2001) 
4.2 (4
th
 qtr. 2006) 
4.2 (1
st
 qtr. 2007) 
10.4 (4
th
 qtr. 2009) 
12.5 (3
rd
 qtr. 2010) 
11.7 (3
rd
 qtr. 2010) 
14.1 (3
rd
 qtr. 2009) 
14.9 (3
rd
 qtr. 2010) 
8..8 (1
st







the peak and trough of the impulse response functions are higher and lower for the 
unemployment and home price index shocks respectively.   
Table 2.5 reports the peak and trough of the state’s mortgage default rates after the 
unemployment and home price index shocks. For the selected states also, there does not seem to 
have been much of an impact on the mortgage default rates during the 1979 to 2000 period for 
both the unemployment and home price shocks.  
For the 2001 to 2010 period, the home price index shocks produced a larger impact on 
the mortgage default rates of California and Florida than the unemployment shocks. For the other 
4 states the impact of the unemployment shocks was larger. For Nevada—which had the largest 
home price depreciation and the highest unemployment rate during this period—the 
unemployment shocks seem to have had a bigger impact on its mortgage default rates.  
 
Table 2.9 
This table reports the peak and trough of the impulse response functions of the state mortgage 
default rates due to a one standard deviation increase in the state unemployment rate and the state 
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           1.8 
           2.3 
           1.5 
           2.4 
           0.6 
       -1.2 
       -0.7 
       -0.8 
       -0.6 
       -0.6 
       -1.4 
           19.9 
             8.0 
           11.6  
           15.1 
           19.8 
             7.1 
         -12.0 
         -10.4 
         -14.8 
           -7.7 
         -11.4 


















































2.6.3 Variance Decomposition 
The variance decomposition is performed for both the 1979 to 2000 and the 2001 to 2010 
periods at            ) and               ). Table 2.10 presents the results. At the state 
level also the unemployment and home price index shocks do not explain much of the variation 
in the forecast errors of the mortgage default rate for the 1979 to 2000 period. During the 2001 to 
2010 period, the unemployment shocks explained more of the variation in the mortgage defaults 
rates than the home price index shocks at both the one and two year horizon. As Tables 2.7 and 
2.8 shows, there have been significant changes in both the unemployment rates and the home 
price indices, but the changes in the unemployment rate on average explained more of the 
variation in the state mortgage default rates than the changes in the home price indices.  
Policies that aim to decrease the default rates across the states should take into account 
the relative impact of the two shocks in explaining the variation in the mortgage default rate.  If 
home price should dominate, then government programs that reduce the overall principal might 
be beneficial for that state. By contrast, if unemployment shocks dominate, reduction in 
























This table reports the variance decompositions, equation (17), of the states’ mortgage default 
rates for 1979 to 2000 and 2001 to 2010 samples for            ) and                ).  















States 1979 to 2000 2001 to 2010 
Unemployment Price Unemployment Price 







   1.5           1.5 
   7.0           7.3 
   7.6           7.9 
   3.1           3.2 
   4.8           5.1 
   1.8           1.8 
   2.7        3.6 
   0.8        0.9   
   0.9        1.2 
   0.4        0.4 
   0.5        0.6 
   1.3        1.3 
    53           57 
    17           14 
    27           26 
    62           60 
    54           43 
    40           37 
    19         18 
    21         38 
    28         32 
    10         12 
    10         22 







2.7 Conclusion  
 The increase in mortgage default rates over the last several years has created a renewed 
interest in the factors drive mortgage defaults. There has been an increase in the number of 
subprime loans originated after 2003, due to lax mortgage underwriting standards. This has 
increase the number of borrowers who are more susceptible to unemployment and negative home 
price shocks. These borrowers have little savings they could use to cushion them against 
unemployment and negative home price shocks. Studies have drawn conflicting conclusions as 
to which of these two factors have accounted for the most of the variation in the mortgage 
default rates. There is an important policy implications for how best to help home owners under 
water depending on which factor dominates. As Elul et al (2010) stated if negative equity 
dominates, then government programs that reduce the overall principal might be beneficial. By 
contrast, if unemployment shocks should dominate, reduction in payments (or subsidization 
mortgage payments) might be the better policy.  
The paper uses an SVAR model to disentangle the interrelations between the home price 
index (which tracks housing prices) and unemployment shocks and mortgage default rates by 
studying the dynamics of these two shocks on mortgage default rates from 1979 to 2010 at the 
national, regional and state levels. The results show that, with the exception of the Pacific region, 
California and Florida, unemployment shocks explain more of the variation in the mortgage 
default rates than home price indices shock at the national, regional and state levels, especially, 
during the 2001 to 2010 period. These two shocks together are responsible on average for about 
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A.1 Moody’s Ratings 
Moody’s Ratings  
Aaa AAA 
Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 AA 
A1, A2, A3 A 
Baa1, Baa2, Baa3 BBB 
Ba1, Ba2, Ba3 BB 
























A.2 (Regions: US Census Bureau)
 
East North Central: Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio  
East South Central: Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama 
Middle Atlantic: New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania  
Mountain Census Division: Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New  
Mexico 
New England: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut  
Pacific Census Division: Hawaii, Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California 
South Atlantic: Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia,  
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida 
West North Central: North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa, Kansas,  
Missouri 










B.2 Forecasting with Estimated Process 
From Lutkepohl (2005), if we denote the parameter estimators of the SVAR system, Equation 
(3), as   ̂...    ̂ and  ̂ 
The asymptotic estimator of the covariance matrix of the prediction error is given by: 
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And   is the      coefficient of the canonical MA representation of   , Equation (13).  
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 ̂  is the estimate of the covariance matrix of the innovations and  ̂  is the covariance matrix  
of the asymptotic distribution of √   ̂   ).  
 
For a simulation with R repetitions, this algorithm is used
54
: 
1. Fit the model and save the estimated coefficients. Only data up to T is used for the estimation.  
 
2. Use the estimated coefficients to calculate the residuals. 
 
3. Repeat steps 3a–3c R times. 
3a. Draw a simple random sample with replacement of size T +h from the residuals. 
When the  th observation is drawn, all K residuals are selected, preserving any contemporaneous 
correlation among the residuals. 
3b. Use the sampled residuals, p initial values of the endogenous variables, any 
exogenous variables, and the estimated coefficients to construct a new sample dataset. 
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C.2 Individual structural test 
 
Table C.2.1 
This table reports the optimal lag for estimating equation (16) for the full sample (1979 to 2010) 































National and Regions 
ARMA Degrees of Freedom 
National (6,2) F(11,107) 
East North Central (4,2) F(11,109) 
East South Central  (6,2) F(11,107) 
Middle Atlantic  (3,2) F(11,110) 
Mountain (4,2) F(11,109) 
New England  (3,1) F(11,111) 
Pacific (5,2) F(11,108) 
South Atlantic (2,2) F(11,111) 
West North Central  (5,2) F(11,108) 







D.2 Graphs of National and Regional Mortgage Default Rate 
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